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ABSTRACT 
With the growing discussion on great power competition between the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), few studies offer a quantitative analysis 
of the growing influence of the PRC across the globe. We hypothesized that the various 
national levers employed by the PRC would be associated with more favorable 
foreign policies from Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, though not to the 
extent that some believe. In order to measure influence, United Nations general 
assembly votes (specifically votes relating to human rights issues) were utilized to 
assess the relationship between the voting patterns of LAC countries and the voting 
patterns of the PRC. Our statistical analysis finds that many factors thought to be 
consequential have no consistent relationship to China’s geopolitical influence. 
However, military arms sales were found to be positively related to agreement with 
China’s UN votes.  In contrast, recognition of Taiwan and relative trade balance were 
found to have negative effects. Taken as whole, the available evidence undercuts the 
claim that the PRC is making significant strides, or hurting America's standing, in the 
LAC region. 
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A. BOTTOM LINE  
Available open-source data does not support the conclusion that the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) is gaining considerable geo-political leverage within Latin 
American and the Caribbean (LAC).  
B. BACKGROUND  
Trump Administration documents (National Security Strategy and National 
Defense Strategy) call for an “America First” grand strategy focused on great power 
competition, in particular, the growing threat from China.1 Many well-researched 
qualitative studies point to the PRC’s growing global influence and influence within LAC, 
however, very few studies quantitatively address this growing concern.2  
C. METHODOLOGY 
Using regression analysis, combined with proxy measures derived from human 
rights voting patterns within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) from 2000–
2017, this study aimed to determine whether increasing PRC activities are yielding 
increased influence in LAC. The study included various data sources from across the 
Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) spectrum as independent 
     
1 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (The White House, December 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.; “Summary of 
the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (United States Department of 
Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf. 
2 R. Evan Ellis, China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic 
Position (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077; Harold Trinkunas, “Renminbi Diplomacy? 
The Limits of China’s Influence on Latin America’s Domestic Politics,” Foreign Policy at Brookings Order 
From Chaos: Foreign Policy in a Troubled World, no. Paper 3 (November 2016); Graham T. Allison, 
“Destined for War?,” The National Interest, no. 149 (2017): 9; Krishnadev Calamur, “‘The Price’ of 




variables. Population, GDP, previous voting behavior, and political regime type were also 
included as control variables.3  
D. FINDINGS 
Our statistical analysis finds that many factors thought to be consequential have no 
consistent relationship to China’s geopolitical influence including diplomatic 
engagements, economic investment, aid, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military 
interaction, and the existence of Confucius Institutes. However, military arms sales were 
found to be positively related to agreement with China’s UN votes. In contrast, recognition 
of Taiwan and relative trade balance were found to have negative effects. The best predictor 
for future voting behavior remains a country’s previous vote score, especially amongst 
democracies. 
E. CONCLUSION 
While further research is needed, the data does not support the conclusion that the 
PRC is gaining significant geo-political influence in the region. Taken as whole, the 
available evidence undercuts the claim that the PRC is making significant strides, or 
hurting America's standing, in the LAC region. This is not to say that these actions by the 
PRC do not gain leverage in other aspects of its relationship with LAC countries; 
however, the evidence does not support the hypothesized effects for these factors. 
Caution should be heeded as the more extreme views of nefarious Chinese global 
activities do not seem to have manifested themselves within LAC. With respect to the 
PRC in LAC, the best possible course of action for American policy-makers is therefore 
to maintain and expand current relationships to continue to protect the homeland from 
localized and third-party threats. It would be a failure of effective decision making and 
thoughtful foreign policy to assess the PRC as the gravest threat to United States security 
and stability in the Western Hemisphere without closely considering the quantitative 
evidence presented in this study. 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
In December 2017, the Trump administration released an updated National Security 
Strategy (NSS), which called for a shift in national focus from counter-terrorism to great 
power competition (GPC). The new administration made it clear that without a realignment 
of national power, American influence within the international community will shrink and 
thus, put American interests at risk, home and abroad. The 2017 NSS states that “China 
and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode 
American security and prosperity.”1 The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), released 
one month later, echoes this viewpoint.2 “China and Russia are now undermining the 
international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously 
undercutting its principles and ‘rules of the road.’”3 The release of the 2017 and 2018 
NDSs were a stark departure from previous White House publications. The 2015 NSS, 
published under the Obama Administration, noted the unprecedented levels of cooperation 
between the United States and China, a relationship that was not considered adversarial, 
but friendly.4 The 2010 NSS, the only other NSS published under the Obama 
administration, called for a more cooperative relationship with countries such as China “on 
the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect.”5 To complicate matters, a recent Heritage 
 
1 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (The White House, December 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
2 “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (United States 
Department of Defense, 2018), 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-
Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
3 “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” 2. 
4 “National Security Strategy” (The White House, February 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf. 
5 “National Security Strategy” (The White House, May 27, 2010), http://nssarchive.us/national-
security-strategy-2010/. 
2 
Foundation report found that United States military is only “marginally” capable of 
addressing the threats to America’s vital interests globally.6 
The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility 
(AOR) is of significant importance due to the proximity to the United States homeland, 
and the fact that it is an increasingly competitive arena with global powers like Russia and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). PRC activity within this AOR increased in recent 
years, but SOUTHCOM has not overtly identified a strategy to evaluate Beijing’s advance 
into Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).  
B. RISE OF THE PRC  
In 1958, A. F. K. Organski predicted that China would become the most powerful 
nation on earth. “The question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation 
on earth, but rather how long it will take her to achieve this status.”7 Furthering this claim, 
John Mearsheimer believes that the United States will no longer be the predominant power 
and that China cannot rise peacefully.8 He argues that the United States and China do not 
have an international governing body to regulate the contentious relationship if aggressive 
behavior arises. Therefore, in the interests of self-preservation, each country must build up 
its military capabilities to address these concerns.9 This buildup of tensions is on the verge 
of the ancient “Thucydides’ Trap,” Graham Allison argues.10 Michael Pillsbury believes 
that the PRC grand strategy is to replace the United States as the global hegemon by the 
one-hundred-year anniversary of the Chinese Communist Revolution in 2049. He argues 
that in this “Hundred Year Marathon,” China’s leaders persuaded the outside world to 
believe that the PRC’s rise will remain peaceful and is not at the cost of others. The PRC’s 
 
6 “2019 Index of Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy United States Military 
Strength” (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, n.d.), 7, 
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/2019_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_WEB.pdf. 
7 Abramo F. K. Organski, World Politics (Knopf, 1958). 
8 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to United States Power in Asia †,” 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–96, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poq016. 
9 Mearsheimer. 
10 Graham T. Allison, “Destined for War?,” The National Interest, no. 149 (2017): 9. 
3 
actions, however, seem to point to the contrary.11 One of the main ways the PRC may be 
gaining global influence is through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  
C. BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
In 2013, Xi Jinping, president of the People’s Republic of China, introduced an 
initiative known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), today more commonly known as the BRI. 
The project is an attempt to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa through a network of railways 
and shipping lanes, with large PRC funded economic undertakings backing the project.12 
Critics of the project point to exploitative and predatory behavior by the PRC in an attempt 
to gain leverage over other countries to further their interests.13 With the expansion of 
global influence, however, some countries are pushing back and adopting their own 
policies towards Chinese involvement, potentially positive and negative for United States 
interests.14 The BRI is now reaching countries in LAC.  
As defined by the China Power Project, “the BRI is an umbrella initiative which 
covers a multitude of investment projects designed to promote the flow of goods, 
investment and people.”15 Many in the PRC’s leadership agree that overseas investments 
could help the country’s public pension to an aging population and satisfy the growing 
middle class.16 The PRC is using the BRI to gain expansion of Chinese exports, promote 
the use of Renminbi (RMB) as an international currency, reduce trade frictions like tariffs, 
 
11 Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as 
the Global Superpower, First Edition. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2015). 
12 “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Global Investment Plan Mapped out — RT Business News,” 
accessed November 19, 2018, https://www.rt.com/business/444288-china-belt-road-investment-map/. 
13 Hong Zhang, “Beyond ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Dissemination of PRC State Capitalism,” 
China Brief 19, no. 1 (January 4, 2019); Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle, 
“China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures,” Center for a New American Security, June 11, 2018; 
Cecilia Joy-Perez and Derek Scissors, “Be Wary of Spending on the Belt and Road,” American Enterprise 
Institute, November 14, 2018, http://www.aei.org/publication/be-wary-of-spending-on-the-belt-and-road/. 
14 Iain Marlow and Dandan Li, “How Asia Fell Out of Love With China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” 
December 10, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-10/how-asia-fell-out-of-love-with-
china-s-belt-and-road-initiative. 
15 China Power Team, “How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s Interests?,” 
ChinaPower Project (blog), May 8, 2017, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/. 
16 David Dollar, “China’s Investment in Latin America,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, Order from 
Chaos: Foreign Policy in a Troubled World, no. Paper 4 (January 2017): 8. 
4 
and put unused and underutilized state-owned capital and workforce to use.17 In concept, 
the BRI makes perfect sense: it is the conduit of a symbiotic relationship between the host 
country and the PRC.  
As BRI proliferation continues, natural pushback is occurring. In the Maldives, the 
former president, Abdulla Yameen, lost a national election one month after signing a deal 
to provide PRC funding for a large bridge infrastructure project due to concerns over details 
of the agreement. In Malaysia, the new prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, is openly 
critical of the BRI and suspended and canceled many PRC projects citing “colonialism” by 
the PRC.18 Imran Khan’s Pakistani government is under investigation for awarding a dam 
construction project to a Chinese company after purposefully disqualifying another local 
bid.19 Despite repeated statements that the BRI is purely economic in nature, in Pakistan, 
“China is for the first time explicitly tying a Belt and Road proposal to its military 
ambitions—and confirming the concerns of a host of nations who suspect the infrastructure 
initiative is really about helping China project armed might.”20  
Now, evidence is pointing to a potential BRI slow-down in global investment. 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) investment into the BRI fell considerably in 
2018.21 This trend could be due to falling foreign exchange reserves, putting more pressure 
on the Chinese state: “If China ever conceived of implementing a debt trap, it became no 
longer affordable when its foreign reserves began to fall less than a year after the BRI was 
announced.”22 This challenge highlights the possibility that the PRC’s program may be 
 
17 China Power Team, “How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s Interests?” 
18 Marlow and Li, “How Asia Fell Out of Love With China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” 
19 June Teufel Dreyer, “The Belt, the Road, and Latin America - Foreign Policy Research Institute,” 
https://www.fpri.org/, 16 JAN 19, https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/01/the-belt-the-road-and-latin-
america/. 
20 Maria Abi-Habib, “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Plan in Pakistan Takes a Military Turn,” The New York 
Times, December 19, 2018, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/world/asia/pakistan-china-
belt-road-military.html. 
21 Derek Scissors, “Chinese Investment: State-Owned Enterprises Stop Globalizing, for the Moment,” 
American Enterprise Institute, January 17, 2019, http://www.aei.org/publication/chinese-investment-state-
owned-enterprises-stop-globalizing-for-the-moment/. 
22 Joy-Perez and Scissors, “Be Wary of Spending on the Belt and Road.” 
5 
slowing down or even failing long-term. The negative impacts of the program could be 
outweighing the advantages gained by conducting risky investments overseas.  
Understanding how best to respond and evaluate PRC’s various activities in the 
Western Hemisphere is essential for SOUTHCOM planners and United States 
policymakers as the United States increasingly finds itself in a potentially competitive 
environment with the PRC. In order to construct a pragmatic response to PRC activity in 
LAC, decisionmakers must first have a clear understanding of LAC reactions to the issue 
and understand which PRC initiatives are actually gaining influence and which are not. 
Too often, the United States has intervened in other nations’ affairs with little regard to the 
local population and governments’ stance on the matter.23 This study aims to illuminate 
LAC reactions to PRC activity in order to educate personnel with a vested interest in the 
region.  
D. SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report named the United States-
China relationship “the world’s most consequential bilateral relationship.”24 The report 
published the United States Trade Representative’s findings, which lists four distinct PRC 
policies that call for United States action: “(1) Forced technology transfer requirements, 
(2) Cyber-theft of United States trade secrets, (3) Discriminatory licensing requirements, 
and (4) Attempts to acquire United States technology to advance China’s industrial 
policies.”25 In 2015, President Xi openly stated that China would no longer support hackers 
to commit theft of United States intellectual property, clearly admitting previous 
condonement.26 These predatory actions toward the United States contributed to the 
 
23 Stephen. Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, 1st 
paperback ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2007). 
24 Susan Lawrence and Wayne Morrison, “US and China Policy,” Congressional Research Service 7–
5700, no. IF10119 (September 18, 2018). 
25 Lawrence and Morrison, 1. 
26 Jordan Robertson and Michael Riley, “China Used a Tiny Chip in a Hack That Infiltrated United 




ongoing high-profile exchange of tariffs between the United States and the PRC, after 
which, cyber theft and espionage resumed.27 Militarily, the PRC gained global attention in 
the construction of man-made islands in the South China Sea, and claiming sole 
sovereignty over the region. This “nine-dash” line is in direct contradiction of international 
law, rejecting Filipino and Vietnamese claims to the region.28 However, while the general 
consensus is that the rise of the PRC is dangerous for the United States, the vote is not 
unanimous.  
Michael Beckley believes that the United States is not in peril from rising Chinese 
influence and argues that China is economically overextended and will not be able to keep 
up with the growth of the United States.29 Therefore, he argues that the solution is to 
engage with China instead of employing an alienating foreign policy.30 Ronald Tammen 
argues that the best way to deter the PRC’s rise is not through threats, embargos, or 
sanctions, but rather through “socializing” the growing power into the international system 
with rules and regulations accepted as normal by the United States and western powers.31 
Hugh White also argues for a cooperative approach and pushes for mutual concessions 
during the PRC’s rise in order to prevent a future disaster. White posits that the relationship 
will always be competitive; the question is whether that competition will lead down a 
dangerous path to conflict.32  
 
27 Lorand Laskai and Adam Segal, “A New Old Threat: Countering the Return of Chinese Industrial 
Cyber Espionage,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed December 21, 2018, 
https://www.cfr.org/report/threat-chinese-espionage. 
28 Shirley V Scott, “China’s Nine-Dash Line, International Law, and the Monroe Doctrine Analogy,” 
China Information 30, no. 3 (2016): 296–311, https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X16665054. 
29 Michael Beckley, “Stop Obsessing About China: Why Beijing Will Not Iperil U.S. Hegemony,” 
Foreign Affairs, September 21, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-09-21/stop-
obsessing-about-china. 
30 Beckley. 
31 Ronald L. Tammen, “The Organski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program,” International 
Interactions 34, no. 4 (December 11, 2008): 321, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620802561769. 
32 Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
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II. THE PRC IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  
Despite the Indo-Pacific focus of the BRI and other Chinese activities, the PRC is 
also active in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since 2000, the PRC’s engagement in LAC 
steadily increased. For this study, these activities are described along diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic (DIME) categories, which are the four instruments of 
national power as defined by United States joint doctrine.33 In November 2008, the PRC 
published a policy paper concerning relations with Latin America calling for “consultation, 
cooperation, mutual respect, and finding ‘win-win’ solutions.”34 In 2016, the PRC 
expanded its commitments in Latin America by employing “exchanges and dialogues, 
trade and investment, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and technical 
innovation.”35 Evan Ellis, a leading scholar on the PRC influence in Latin America, 
describes the PRC’s engagement  as one that “generates a complex mixture of opportunities 
and threats for the region’s countries as well as for the United States”36 Although the 
DIME model is a framework used by the United States government, it provides useful 
categories to help explain the power, and therefore influence, of any state by describing the 
full spectrum of its operations around the world.37  Illuminating PRC interactions with 
Latin American countries shows the need for further research on the topic and warrants a 
further discussion on how states compete for power within this space.  
 
33 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 (Washington, D.C., 2018). 
34 Harold Trinkunas, “Renminbi Diplomacy? The Limits of China’s Influence on Latin America’s 
Domestic Politics,” Foreign Policy at Brookings Order From Chaos: Foreign Policy in a Troubled World, 
no. Paper 3 (November 2016): 8. 
35 Mark Sullivan and Thomas Lum, “China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean,” 
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The PRC’s diplomatic activities in LAC work hand-in-hand with economic, 
military and informational initiatives. PRC President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang made four 
trips to Latin America since 2013, visiting 11 countries. Early in 2018, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi met in Chile with 33 members of the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC) with an intent to join the BRI.38 It is important to note that 
CELAC does not include the United States or Canada.39 Through these types of diplomatic 
engagements, many Latin American governments are breaking ties with Taiwan, 
intensifying the island’s isolation diplomatically and economically. Panama, El Salvador, 
and the Dominican Republic all broke ties with Taiwan in the past three years in response 
to considerable economic trade and investment packages brokered by mainland China.40  
In 2017, China participated in the summit of the Americas for the first time, which 
conversely was the first time the United States president did not attend the summit. Coupled 
with the United States withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), reduction in 
United States foreign aid to the region, and growing Sino-American trade tensions, this 
backsliding by the United States provides the PRC a potential opportunity to fill the 
diplomatic vacuum.41 Given Latin America’s checkered past with the United States, 
China’s style of diplomacy may be seen as a breath of fresh air to a trusting customer. 
Furthermore, SOUTHCOM has typically had less national emphasis than other Geographic 
Combatant Commands (GCC) due to their focus on illicit drug trade when compared to 
other problem sets, such as counter-terrorism in the Middle East and Africa, countering 
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Russia in Europe, and the multitude of issues in the Indo-PACOM AOR. It is relatively 
easy for China to get its foot in the door and plant the diplomatic seed for future economic 
exploitation.  
B. INFORMATION 
While not as distinct or easily described as economic investments or diplomatic 
visits, PRC efforts in the informational space should not be disregarded. Recognizing the 
value in accompanying investment and diplomatic exchanges with Chinese values and 
messaging, Chinese technology and dissemination platforms exist across the region. The 
CCP currently sponsors 39 Confucius Institutes (CI) and 11 more Confucius Classrooms 
throughout the region. These educational platforms seek to “shape influential political, 
media, and other LAC leaders’ opinions” about the PRC’s place in the world and ideals 
abroad.42 Plainly put, these government-funded institutes and classrooms within higher-
level education institutions teach classes on Chinese language and culture and are often 
cited as spreading messages and bolstering support for PRC foreign policy objectives.  
Beyond the CIs, media broadcast in the Spanish language is among the key 
elements in the global expansion of Chinese sponsored media.43 Over the past decade, 
PRC companies invested heavily in radio stations, television channels, newspapers, and 
magazines in an effort to compete with western news outlets and control global perceptions 
of the PRC. Despite this considerable effort, major concerns exist over issues with 
credibility and trust compared to other news outlets.44 In June 2018, the non-profit Global 
Americans released a report finding that two Chinese state-run media outlets, Xinhua and 
China Daily, regularly release “misleading articles that are overly positive of China’s 
economic relations with the region.”45 While the exact effects of these media outlets and 
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Confucius Institutes are hard to gauge, their existence and the CIs deserve to be considered 
in a holistic evaluation of PRC activities in the region.  
C. MILITARY 
Over the past decade, the PRC ascended to become the third-largest global producer 
of military arms behind the United States and Russia.46 The PRC expanded past traditional 
economic interaction with the LAC region. The value of arms imports of LAC countries 
from China rose steadily between 2000 and 2015 and as the amount of economic 
investment and diplomatic exchanges increased with Latin American countries, so too did 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS).47 A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report 
concluded: 
PRC defense sales and assistance to the region have expanded from small 
arms to advanced weapons systems. They include military exchanges with 
various countries, military helicopters and vehicles to Bolivia, rifles and 
patrol boats to Ecuador, rocket launch vehicles to Peru, and fighter aircraft 
and armored personnel carriers to Venezuela.48 
These considerable sales of military arms provide the initial stages for military 
interaction and relationships between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Latin 
American countries, as the sale of military equipment is not a single action. The purchase 
of military equipment often comes with the requirement for specialized training and 
extended maintenance on the units of order, increasing dependency on the originating 
country.49 
In addition to FMS, the PRC began a counter-program to the United States’s 
International Military and Education & Training (IMET) program, aggressively courting 
many military officers from Latin American countries on all-expenses paid education 
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enrollment in China.50 At least 18 Latin American countries have participated in this 
program.51 In 2010, the PRC conducted its first bilateral military exercise in the region 
with Peru, a United States ally.52 2018 saw the inaugural visit of the PRC Navy hospital 
ship, “Peace Ark” to the region.53 In all, the PRC’s military activities include “(1) meetings 
between senior military officials; (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions; (3) 
military sales; (4) military-relevant commercial interactions; and, (5) Chinese physical 
presence within Latin America, all of which have military-strategic implications.”54 
D. ECONOMIC 
Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson remarked that, “Today, China is gaining a 
foothold in Latin America. It is using economic statecraft to pull the region into its orbit,” 
followed by “The question is: at what price?”55 Total China-Latin America trade increased 
from $17 billion in 2002 to almost $262 billion in 2014 and was valued at $257 billion in 
2017.56 Between 2015 and 2019, the PRC plans to trade with Latin American countries to 
the tune of $500 billion and $250 billion in direct investment.57 China has become the top 
trading partner of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay and second most-
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frequent user of the Panama Canal as well.58 In June 2017, a company with close ties to 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) purchased the largest container port along the Panama 
Canal following a pattern of port purchases within the guise of the BRI.59 Simply 
becoming the top trading partner alone is not necessarily a cause for concern because of 
the overall high global demand for commodities. What is a cause for concern is the BRI 
eroding hard-fought progress for a Latin American industrial sector, creating strong 
Chinese competition; backsliding on labor, environmental, and human rights reforms; 
encroaching on indigenous populations’ lands; and displaying negative geo-political 
ramifications for the United States.60  
Currently, Chinese banks provide more infrastructure funding and development to 
Latin America and the Caribbean than the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) combined.61 This trend is alarming for the United States, as LAC countries 
with limited access to international institutions due to governance concerns or suspected 
violations of human rights continue to lean on this kind of support. Particularly within 
Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, preferential treatment and concessions are made for 
Chinese companies giving them an unfair advantage over local companies. This pattern is 
in tension with the PRC’s stated principle of “non-interference and respect for 
sovereignty.”62 Additionally, as the PRC negotiates infrastructure projects, the vast 
majority of the negotiated workforce are Chinese, brought in for the specific project. While 
the economic influence of the United States will not be usurped overnight, further 
investigation into all of the PRC’s actions in the region should be conducted.  
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The growing PRC global activity is often framed as a symbiotic relationship 
between China and host countries for the betterment of all by the PRC; however, critics 
claim Beijing may use the BRI to further its diplomatic and strategic objectives, which 
often run counter to United States interests and the interests of receiving nations.63 While 
the PRC slowly and steadily developed inroads in LAC, most attention continues to remain 
on dramatic events like near-misses between warships in the South China Sea and 
expensive BRI projects throughout Eurasia.64  Although economic expansion and limited 
military ties seem like innocent affairs, there is a potential for partner countries to align 
more closely  with the PRC and behave in ways that directly counter United States interests. 
Furthermore, as Sino-Latin American relationships grow, the United States may find  
freedom of action in the region more and more difficult. This dynamic has the potential to 
threaten United States access to shared information, freedom of maneuver for operational 
forces conducting counter-drug or counter-terrorist operations, and access to bases.65 In 
situations such as this, if the United States chooses to enact changes in policies, the 
potential arises to be perceived as imperialistic or meddling with the sovereign affairs of 
neighboring countries. Therefore, a deeper examination of the PRC’s actions is needed in 
order to provide a transparent analysis of the situation. A vital element in crafting United 
States policy is understanding reactions to PRC activity within LAC countries, as opposed 
to our perception of what their reaction is or should be. Once clearly understood, the United 
States can then decide what, if any, elements of national power could or should be 
introduced to exert influence on the situation. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the current impact of the PRC’s diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic (DIME) activities in LAC. Dissenting opinions exist 
within public policy, government, and academic communities about the current state and 
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future role the United States and the PRC will play within the LAC region. Considerable 
research illuminates these issues as a growing concern and calls for policymakers’ 
attention. By the same token, other analysis found current language to be hyperbolic and 
exaggerated. This thesis seeks to bolster this research domain by providing quantitative 
analysis on the efficacy of PRC initiatives based off measurable reactions by LAC 
countries. Based on the authors’ experiences and initial analysis, we find that the threat the 
PRC poses to the United States in LAC is present, but not nearly as grave as some analysis 
projects.  
This analysis will attempt to determine if the PRC’s undertakings are gaining it 
leverage in LAC. Observable PRC activities within the DIME construct will serve as our 
main independent variables (IVs) of interest, while we operationalize influence (our 
dependent variable) with UN Voting data. Not only will this research contribute to 
academia’s continuing investigation into our ever-evolving world, but it will provide 
additional recommendations to United States policy-makers on the actual effect of 
increased PRC activity in the Western Hemisphere. 
The response to PRC activity is not a one-size-fits-all solution. In order to identify 
specific measures to maintain United States influence in the region, we must first examine 
the issue using a measures of influence that reflects the views of LAC countries, as opposed 
to imposing a Monroe Doctrine 2.0. Attempting to limit as many potential biases in the 
analysis is also necessary to prevent the cognitive traps of assuming causation of malicious 
behavior because of increased activity in a region or simply approaching this complicated 
issue through an exclusively American perspective.66  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Considerable research highlights how hard and soft power increases influence and 
leverage in a target country or region. Joseph Nye summarizes it well, “Power is the ability 
to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, and that can be done by coercion, payment 
or attraction.”67 Several schools of thought exist on what levers should be used and their 
utility in different situations. This study relies on the DIME construct to frame this analysis 
and examine various points of view. Graham Allison has observed, for analyzing the utility 
of alternative ways to solve a problem, “there is no clear alternative to this basic 
framework.”68 An examination of the prominent literature and thinkers within each 
instrument of national power will help define the conditions under which a country might 
be influenced, as well as potential gaps in our understanding of the phenomena occurring 
currently between the PRC and LAC countries.  
A. MILITARY 
A military is vital to its nation in the form of securing its own sovereignty as well 
as interests abroad. In the modern age, this includes considerable discussion on the use of 
military force outside the traditional bounds of warfare. From GEN Votel’s “UW in the 
Gray Zone”69 to the now infamous Gerasimov Doctrine,70 military leaders see the utility 
and value in the proliferation of the use of military action to gain influence. George Kennan 
referred to this in 1948, stating that political war is the “the employment of all the means 
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at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”71 This domain 
most certainly involves a nation’s military. 
Joseph Nye originally coined the distinction between “soft” and “hard power.” He 
defines each as “Hard power is the use of coercion and payment. Soft power is the ability 
to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction. If a state can set the agenda for others or 
shape their preferences, it can save a lot on carrots and sticks.”72 Further explained: “Hard 
power is a push; soft power is a pull,” where a military entity can fulfill both roles as with 
a naval vessel can blockade a country (hard power) or provide humanitarian relief (soft 
power).73 Leslie Gelb claims that soft power essentially encompasses everything that a 
nation does;74 however, Nye counters with the distinction that many elements below the 
threshold of military violence still count as hard power75 and for a state to be successful in 
influencing, it needs to leverage both hard and soft power in concert, or as Nye calls, “smart 
power.”76 
This “smart” power is how modern leaders can use military force short of violence 
to further a nation’s interests. Carol Atkinson argues that while a nation’s diplomatic arm 
is mostly considered the proponent for soft power within a government, the military is fully 
capable of contributing to soft power abroad, especially through military exchange 
programs.77 In fact, her empirical study found that military officer exchanges actually 
contributed to soft power and influence for the United States.78 
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For Yinghong Shi, the Chinese use the “strategic military” to complement the 
“strategic economy” in order to gain international influence.79 Chinese President Xi sees 
military diplomacy as a “critical element in how China engages with other countries.”80 
This military diplomacy includes joint military exercises, arms sales, port visits, senior-
level meetings, non-traditional security operations, and functional military exchanges.81 
However, Kenneth Allen found that globally, increased PLA diplomatic activity does not 
always translate into increased Chinese influence over the host country.82 This finding may 
indicate that despite increased military investment in the region, there has yet to manifest 
a return for the PRC or that the intended gain in influence has yet to be effectively 
measured. 
B. ECONOMIC 
Asymmetrical trade relationships are known to lead to potential coercion by the 
stronger state imposing its will on the smaller state. Here the distinction between economic 
sensitivity and actual vulnerability is essential. If a state or entity can adjust easily and 
procure the potential loss in other ways or forms, it is simply a sensitivity; whereas a 
vulnerability considerably impacts the local market.83 When faced with a potential 
vulnerability issue, the PRC is able to pit target state actors against each other in 
competition for slices of the economic market.84  
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For Beijing, “strategic economy” is the preferred method of gaining global 
influence as it poses the least risk of producing conflict and is a more effective tool.85 
David Baldwin shows that the use of economic statecraft has utility in the modern world 
and cannot be ignored.86 This analysis follows Reilly’s definition in which “economic 
statecraft is the use of economic resources by political leaders to exert influence in pursuit 
of foreign policy objectives.”87 Harris and Blackwill further the distinction by separating 
geo-economics (soft power) and geo-politics (hard power), arguing that the United States 
lost its ability to conduct soft power and therefore resorts to military means.88 China, on 
the other hand, leverages economic soft power extremely well, controlling a considerable 
swath of SOEs, which are better suited to achieve national policy goals compared with 
western equivalents.89 This unique, expanded soft power capability enables the PRC to 
exert influence and power via more avenues and with fewer restrictions than western 
counterparts.  
The PRC uses cooperative economic efforts (“carrots”) and coercive economic 
efforts, such as threats of sanctions (“sticks”) to achieve its economic goals and gain 
support.90 In most cases, the PRC rewards favorable behavior and punishes undesirable 
behavior by a target nation. Eventually, this produces a “political transformation and 
desirable changes in target behavior.”91 These cooperative efforts showcase the PRC’s 
“economic heft” and can have massive effects on smaller nations.92 Larger nations are not 
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exempt. In 2009, after France met with the Dalai Lama, the PRC signed economic deals 
with other European nations, France not included. Eventually, France recognized Tibet as 
sovereign Chinese territory, and soon thereafter, a Chinese trade delegation returned to 
France.93  
Cooperative economic efforts can be used in nefarious ways as well. The PRC uses 
debt as a weapon system in predatory behavior towards weak or unstable nations.94 This 
practice can be seen in the acquisition of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Australia’s Port 
Darwin, amongst many other examples of renegotiation of loans for partial or full 
ownership of physical infrastructure.95 Conventional multilateral lending institutions like 
the IMF and the World Bank adhere to strict regulations on investment in developing 
countries due to concerns of corruption, governance issues, and human rights violations. 
The PRC sidesteps these roadblocks using its own banks for foreign investment.96  
On the other end of the economic influence spectrum are even more coercive 
economic measures, such as sanctions. According to Alistair Smith, sanctions are generally 
only effective when the economic or political benefits outweigh the cost of 
implementation.97 Furthermore, Whang et al. argues that sanctions are effective when the 
target country is asymmetrically dependent on the sender’s trade.98 Niou and Lacy take 
the argument further by asserting that “sanctions that are likely to succeed will do so at the 
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mere threat of sanctions.”99 However, for the PRC, economic cooperation efforts are more 
successful than economic coercion as limiting SOEs economic ventures also has adverse 
domestic effects.100 To date, research shows the ability of the PRC to leverage 
considerable economic influence in foreign markets.101 
C. INFORMATION 
While “hard power” encompasses more direct, aggressive forms of projection like 
military force, economic sanctions, and coercion, information tends to fall under the “soft 
power” umbrella, with a few exceptions. The informational spread of a country’s culture, 
political ideals, and policies is a tool often overlooked by decisionmakers, one that can be 
extremely effective without loss of life or the use of violence.102 Additionally, a state’s 
internal information, and its willingness to listen and take advantage of it is also important 
for foreign policy and decision-making. While soft power is appealing, it is often vague 
and hard to grasp. As Joseph Nye explains, “in a global information age…success depends 
not only on whose army wins, but on whose story wins.”103  
Information has the potential to bring about great good or great harm. If timed 
incorrectly, projected to the wrong audience, and de-synchronized, information operations 
can often do more harm than good. It is imperative to time messaging correctly with 
diplomatic negotiations in order to be effective. Much like diplomacy, information has the 
ability to prevent bloodshed and bring about cooperation between states. The Sun Tzu 
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dictum, “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting,” 
has often been the battle cry for practitioners attempting to win the “Information 
Operations” battle.104 Unfortunately, many countries tend to focus solely on the military 
and economic tools, often discounting the value and importance of information operations. 
Following WWII, propaganda and political warfare capabilities diminished within the 
United States due to rapid demobilization. A dangerous vacuum remained, which led to 
the Soviet Union freely pushing radical communist policies to receptive countries around 
the world. Fortunately, the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 provided a 
fresh impetus and organizational vehicle for covert information operations and political 
action in peacetime.105  
While most literature focuses on the broadcasting and exploitation of information 
external to a state as a policy lever, this is only part of the equation. Information internal to 
a state is also critical for making pragmatic policy decisions. Regardless of government 
type, a population’s desires and attitudes must be considered if a country wants to progress. 
Internal to a state, the media plays a key role in this regard. Investigative journalism and a 
free press are critical to the accountability of policymakers and the free flow of information 
in democratic societies. Disregarding these sentiments can weaken or even make obsolete 
the other three instruments of national power. An example of this can be seen in the United 
States involvement in Vietnam. A disconnect between policymakers and constituents, lies 
from decisionmakers, and a broken relationship between military experts and their civilian 
counterparts can be counted as failures in the information domain.106 Authoritarian states 
are not immune. Venezuela is currently experiencing riots and calls for new leadership as 
hunger, power cuts, hyperinflation, and medicine shortages have created unrest throughout 
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the country.107 These phenomena did not happen overnight. Two decades of corruption, 
authoritarian policies, and a failure to listen to the masses have slowly eroded the trust the 
people have in their decisionmakers. Internal information was either disregarded or never 
heard, and Venezuela currently finds itself in a situation in which military might, economic 
policies, and diplomatic negotiation have limited utility. With the above conditions in LAC, 
the PRC has several opportunities to leverage soft power and spread misinformation that 
furthers their own agendas. The PRC’s use of information in conjunction with its economic 
and military policies with regard to LAC will be an important factor moving forward. 
D. DIPLOMATIC 
The diplomatic instrument is one that is inextricably linked to the other three 
instruments of national power, as diplomats will often use information, military, and 
economic tools as leverage or power in international negotiations. Like the information 
lever, diplomacy is hard to measure. Both the diplomatic and information instruments deal 
in the realm of the intellectual, and often emotional, rather than the physical, which makes 
analysis somewhat difficult.108  Hans Morgenthau referred to diplomacy as all relations 
conducted short of war, reducing statecraft down to either diplomacy or violence.109 While 
this view is over-simplistic and limiting, it displays the bleed-over between the different 
foreign policy tools.  Diplomatic processes can be defined in terms of power or influence, 
essentially the ability of one party to change the actions or predispositions of another party 
in some way.110 Sir Charles Webster believed that successful diplomacy hinges on three 
things: "providing the right climate of opinion, devising the right forms of agreement, and 
creating or perceiving the right moment at which the maximum effort can be applied."111 
Failure to balance and manage these three principles can lead a state down a disastrous 
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path, whereas skillful diplomats can wield them successfully to prevent the use of military 
force or economic coercion to meet an end state. While there are various definitions of 
successful diplomacy, these three captures the skills a diplomat needs to negotiate 
successfully on behalf of his or her country. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin argued that "human 
agency is fundamental in shaping political outcomes."112 “A leader’s propensity to seek 
consensus or to provoke polarization has repercussions on the consistency of foreign policy 
and its ability to perform in the medium and long term.”113  
If one were to examine diplomatic failures throughout history, that is, negotiations 
that broke down and led to a security dilemma and possibly bloodshed, each case would 
reveal a failure of employing at least one of the three principles (e.g., WWII, dollar 
diplomacy in LAC, Arab uprisings, the Ukraine crisis). On the contrary, successful 
implementation of the three principles has led to successful negotiations elsewhere (e.g., 
Camp David accords, the United States opening to China, and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation treaty). Often, diplomatic negotiations fail because states are too rigid and 
unwavering to compromise, falling into a “flat view” cognition trap and seeing the world 
as one dimensional.114 The United States was guilty of this often during the Cold War, 
simplifying others as either with us or against us and refusing to display sufficient empathy 
or imagination in solving problems. As Winston Churchill observed, “the reason for having 
diplomatic relations is not to confer a compliment but to secure a convenience.” Warren 
M. Christopher, one of the most successful United States diplomats of our time, wisely 
stated that “careful listening may be the secret weapon” and that a “wise nation, however 
powerful, understands the peril it invites in confronting the will of another people. Outside 
powers have an effect, if any, only on the margins.”115 With this in mind, it is important 
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to understand that the above principles may not work in every situation. Diplomacy is a 
complicated art that is dependent on many factors. As Dr. Christopher Darnton argued, 
“several possible pathways may lead to successful rapprochement.”116 He argues that the 
problem is often not related to reaching an agreement with a foreign counterpart through 
diplomatic means. Rather, the issue commonly lies in overcoming internal bureaucratic 
disagreement and domestic political agendas in reaching a common front with regard to 
external power. In a democracy, there are several agencies with various responsibilities and 
associated budgets. Some departments or agencies may not benefit long term from 
rapprochement and will work to maintain a rivalry in order to reinforce and preserve their 
relevancy. Dr. Darnton claims that, “these actors will tend to oppose efforts by national 
leaders to overcome international rivalry.”117 The point in highlighting this alternative 
point of view is to underscore that diplomacy is a complicated art. No universal answers 
exist, and at times, the best of intentions end up being counterproductive.  
The intent here is to analyze the above attributes to hypothesize which PRC 
initiatives have a greater chance of success and which ones will most likely falter. Given 
Latin America’s checkered past with the United States, China’s style of diplomacy may be 
seen as a breath of fresh air to a trusting customer. The PRC claims that it wants these states 
to rule as they see fit, with much fewer limits than the United States imposes.118 Further 
examination is required to determine what the intended effects are for PRC diplomacy in 
LAC. 
E. LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In order for a state to employ the above tools, it is necessary to understand the 
recipient’s modus operandi to determine which combination of levers is most practical. 
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The same economic statecraft or military coercion that is effective against one country or 
region may prove to be disastrous in another. A summary of LAC foreign policy and 
behavior in world politics in the past will assist in understanding how they may behave in 
the future.  
Latin America and the Caribbean is a region that is often viewed as homogenous 
due to the many shared attributes of each country. While marked differences among these 
countries exist (and will likely continue to exist) in terms of “national capabilities, foreign 
policy styles, political regimes and external linkages,” the purpose of this section is to 
define broadly common LAC foreign policy behavior.119 States in the region share similar 
histories of colonialism, all have economies that are heavily dependent on export of 
primary products and natural resources, and many LAC countries share cultural attributes 
due to a “common experience in which Europeans occupied and colonized indigenous 
communities.”120 Additionally, LAC states all have the common trait of sharing a 
hemisphere with a global hegemon, the United States, an attribute that clearly influences 
policy decision-making.  
Common goals that drive foreign policy in LAC countries are autonomy, 
development, and the management of their relationship with the United States.121 The most 
frequently cited explanatory factors impacting Latin American foreign policy are “United 
States influence, poor economic resources, leader and regime ideology, and the global 
distribution of power and wealth.”122 While Latin American foreign policy is essentially 
about dependence, it is important to understand that this does not mean they will 
necessarily kowtow to foreign powers. Gian Gardini and Peter Lambert posit that an 
evident tenet that characterizes almost all LAC administrations is a co-existence between 
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ideology and pragmatism.123 LAC decisionmakers in the past have had a remarkable 
ability to balance ideological notions (“the desirable”) with pragmatic policy (“the 
achievable”).124 During the Cold War, the Argentine military junta opposed communism 
and socialist ideals but pragmatically conducted business with the Soviet Union which 
helped delay economic disaster and prop up the military.125 Although Presidents Hugo 
Chavez and Nicholas Maduro of Venezuela view the United States as imperialistic, it did 
not stop them from maintaining the United States as a primary trading partner.126 This 
balance of ideology and pragmatism is a concept that deserves attention when attempting 
to predict how LAC administrations may behave and the true intent behind policy actions.  
Hey breaks down LAC foreign policy into three theoretical building blocks: pro-
core vs. anti-core; 2) autonomous vs. dependent; and 3) economic vs. political-
diplomatic.127 For the purpose of this study, the first two will be examined in order to 
better understand current LAC behavior with regard to the PRC. The “core” is referring to 
the industrialized world and includes key actors like the United States, the World Bank, 
and the IMF. The difference in this dichotomy is the notion that the above “core” is either 
an ally that should be leveraged in achieving foreign policy goals or an inherent enemy to 
the state. Four factors are common to all anti-core societies according to Hey: 1) "economic 
dependence and weakness; 2) domestic political turmoil and the desire to consolidate a 
regime; 3) a leader’s desire for personal and national prestige; and 4) public opinion 
favoring development."128  
In the divide between autonomous vs. dependent states, the majority of LAC 
countries lean to the latter. While countries in LAC tend to be dependent on larger states, 
this is not to say that there is a clear relation between external reliance and foreign policy 
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behavior. According to one study, “agreement with the United States position is not a 
positive function of the extent of a country’s dependence.”129 Another work concluded 
that, “the analyses here clearly support an argument that compliance by Latin American 
states in the form of voting agreement with the United States in the UN is unlikely to be 
associated consistently with trade dependence, power disparities, or distance from the 
United States”130  
Robert Pape’s concept of “soft balancing” is also important when thinking about 
LAC foreign policy. Pape’s theory "holds that weaker states confronting a unipolar power 
may leverage nonmilitary tools, such as international institutions, economic statecraft, and 
strict interpretations of neutrality,” to constrain the superpower.131 During much of the 
20th century, countries in LAC had no way of checking United States’ “heightened 
interventionism” and unequaled military power and ability to exert influence in the region, 
and therefore relied on soft balancing to gain some sort of autonomy.132 States that are 
engaged in balancing seek to limit the ability of a power to “impose its preferences on 
others.”133 Historical cases show that soft balancing was effective in LAC in countering 
United States influence in the region.134 With the PRC attempting to gain a similar style 
of influence in the region, it is possible we see a similar strategy employed in order to limit 
the impact of PRC activity. Further research is needed to see what the extent LAC countries 
are reacting to rising PRC activity.  
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F. LITERATURE GAP  
Despite the considerable investigative research into the PRC’s activities within 
LAC, an important research gap still exists. Most major research efforts describe the 
current situation through qualitative, descriptive analysis.135 Economic analyses outline 
growing amounts of investment and economic activity and thus equate this with either a 
growth or reduction in influence within LAC, but often fail to mention other instruments 
of national power.136 The same can be said of evaluations of the PRC’s military activities 
within LAC.137 Researchers tend to hone in on one aspect of Chinese activity, which is 
valuable for those interested in one aspect of the issue. While these efforts are extremely 
well-researched and comprehensively explained, they are only part of the overall picture 
when it comes to the PRC’s activities. A more holistic optic is needed to better evaluate 
the situation, one that accounts for multiple perspectives and controls for a variety of 
factors.  
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Very few studies have examined this topic through a quantitative lens. The Flores 
and Kreps piece (2013) shows that increased levels of trade between the PRC and 
developing countries within LAC and Africa lead to more favorable voting patterns within 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).138 This study, however, includes 
countries (and potentially varying behavioral patterns) outside of LAC and only 
investigates the level of trade between countries. This research seeks to contribute to the 
body of existing research by looking specifically at the LAC region as it pertains to a wider 
array of PRC activities.  
G. MOVING FORWARD 
After analyzing existing literature regarding PRC influence within LAC, it is clear 
that this is now a national policy level concern for the United States. In one of his last 
addresses to Congress, Admiral Tidd (Former USSOUTHCOM Commander) described 
the scarce resources a GCC can bring to bear on a problem that is, at this point, primarily 
economic in nature.139 He argued that the strategic challenge posed by the PRC was not 
yet a military concern and advocated for a more “whole of government approach” to the 
problem. But will a military response be necessary? Many believe that the best solution to 
growing PRC activities is not confrontation but cooperation: “[T]he United States would 
show greatness not by hampering other’s efforts at engaging with the region, but by 
engaging the region’s members, and China, to construct an economically, socially, 
politically, and environmentally responsible future for the hemisphere.”140 While much of 
the literature tends to be wary of the PRC in LAC, it is important to approach this problem 
without biases. Given the PRCs issues at home, and large-scale projects abroad much closer 
to the mainland, it is doubtful the PRC will be able to maintain its high expenditures in a 
region that is unlikely to supplant a deep-rooted United States partnership for a shaky PRC 
partnership. We should also note that hyperbolic language regarding PRC activity poses a 
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danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and leading to impetuous decision-making 
and counterproductive policies. 
While current studies focus on economic development and the associated challenge 
to United States hegemony in the area, there is currently limited research describing how 
PRC activity affects LAC countries’ measurable behavior. This thesis intends to address 
this gap.141  
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In order to address the research question, we use a quantitative approach to examine 
the relationship between the PRC’s economic activities and measurable behavioral effects 
in LAC countries.142 This analysis will leverage a compilation of existing databases that 
capture PRC diplomatic, informational, military, and economic global activity. This study 
will help to determine whether there is a relationship between increased PRC activity in 
LAC and gaining favorable behavior, indicating growing influence within the region. This 
analysis uses linear regression models to determine the impact of PRC activity (IVs) within 
LAC on United Nation (UN) voting trends. The dependent variable (DV) of UN voting 
congruence with China is measured through a continuous index, therefore ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression models are used. The unit of analysis is country, by year, from 
2000–2017.143  
A quantitative approach is appropriate because of the need to account for multiple 
perspectives and aspects, a problem that is difficult to address qualitatively. Existing 
quantitative studies measuring the PRC’s influence are either outside the scope of LAC or 
only consider one or two independent variables (i.e., only trade).144 Additionally, the 
qualitative analysis available only indicates growing PRC activity levels and infers a 
growing amount of influence. This study aims to establish the actual measurable effects of 
increased PRC activity across the entire region. This also has the potential to illuminate in 
which categories the PRC is gaining influence, and in which it is losing.  
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
The independent variables will come from a variety of open-source, publicly 
available databases. Following other quantitative studies, all independent variables were 
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lagged (by one year) in order to provide a directional temporal model and to reduce the 
potential for reverse causation between prior UN voting patterns and subsequent Chinese 
activities. This approach ensures that only activities which preceded votes by at least a year 
can be counted as influencing those votes.  
1. Diplomatic 
The PRC conducts regular diplomatic visits to LAC countries and regularly hosts 
leaders of those nations in China. The Elite Chinese Diplomacy and Financial Flows145 
online visualization tool compiles the known PRC diplomatic visits globally. This includes 
high-level leadership such as president and foreign minister, but also lower-level visits. 
This can be used to record, by country, the number of visits and the reason for each 
interaction. This database is based on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s 
China Vitae, a tracker of over 500 different Chinese officials’ appearance and travel visits 
annually.146 This is used because it is the most comprehensive tracker of Chinese foreign 
and domestic diplomatic engagements.147  
In addition to diplomatic visits, this study considers whether the LAC country 
officially recognizes Taiwan. Over the past few years, the PRC used economic incentives 
to further isolate the island nation by convincing LAC countries to break off official 
diplomatic ties, losing Panama in 2017, and El Salvador and the Dominican Republic in 
2018.148 To capture LAC countries’ official ties with Taiwan, the authors manually created 
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a binary variable tracking recognition by country, by year based on available news and 
public reports.149  
2. Information 
Measuring informational activity within LAC is much more difficult than 
measuring diplomatic visits. The willingness to accept a certain culture, style, language, or 
way of life is subjective and rarely measured quantitatively. The most visible and far 
reaching informational tool employed by the PRC is the establishment of Confucius 
Institutes (CI) to existing colleges and universities. There are currently 42 institutes in the 
region, with 39 established between the study’s analysis period of 2000–2017.150 To 
account for the number of CIs per country, the authors created a tally of the number 
established by country per year and a running tally of these institutes by country, 
aggregating institutes throughout the seventeen-year period. This covers both the potential 
immediate and long-term effects of the institutes. 
3. Military 
For military activity, the study focused on military events or exercises and foreign 
military sales to countries in the LAC region. These two activities are the most appropriate 
measures of military national power as the PRC is not involved in combat operations within 
SOUTHCOM. Military diplomacy includes non-combat type of interactions by the PLA 
and PLA Navy (PLAN) in the region and is captured in the PLA Military Diplomacy 
database sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU).151 Events include joint 
military exercises, port visits, senior-level meetings, non-traditional security operations, 
and functional military exchanges.152 This database is supplemented with the 
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internationally recognized Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms 
Transfers Database which provides trackable FMS transactions.153 
4. Economic  
Tracking the PRC’s global investment is a difficult task as the disclosed CCP 
investments often conflict with open-source data on the same activities. However, there are 
two databases that provide a compilation of the PRC’s economic activities abroad. First is 
the Chinese Global Investment Data, sponsored by the Heritage Foundation and the 
American Enterprise Institute.154 This database tracks global PRC foreign investment, 
both from private and SOEs, spanning from the 1990s to 2018. The drawbacks of this 
database include the lack of PRC aid, grants, and loans. Therefore, the data is augmented 
with the AidData database, sponsored by the College of William and Mary.155 This 
database includes aid, grants, and loans. Unfortunately, AidData only covers the years 
2000–2014, creating a three-year gap in our study. In order to account for this gap, any 
regression models that included the variable of economic aid did not include the 2015–
2017 timeframe. This allowed the regression to take into account all eighteen years of data 
only if the limiting variable (economic aid) was not included. 
In addition to economic investment projects and economic aid, total trade volume 
was gathered from the UN Comtrade Database.156 This provides total trade and exports by 
year, which can also determine trade deficit and trade balance for consideration in 
analysis.157 
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B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable used for this study was derived from United Nations voting 
patterns, specifically in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), from 2000 to 
2017. The database used is the United Nations General Assembly Voting Data from 
Harvard University.158  For decades, UNGA votes have been used to measure states’ 
general orientations and preferences. Throughout the 1980s, Congress produced an annual 
report to the president assessing the “attitudes, policies, and decisions of member 
states.”159 The first academic report to apply a scoring matrix was in 1969 by Edward 
Rowe, with several modifications throughout the decades.160  Granted,  relying on UNGA 
votes to provide feedback on a country’s stance is an inexact art and comes with important 
caveats. There are a multitude of dependent variables that have been used when measuring 
influence in international relations. The University of Edinburgh published a study in 2018 
that used a combination of UN voting, the number of incoming international students and 
tourists, and levels of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) to measure the efficacy of soft 
power.161 However, UN voting is the most common variable used across various studies 
and is the most applicable and wide-ranging metric for the target countries of this study.  
For this report, we have adopted the technique used in 2013 by Flores-Macias and 
Kreps in their study to identify the importance of trade with Africa and Latin America.162  
This method puts a different value on abstentions, as it is generally agreed that an 
abstention should not weigh as heavily as a disagreement between two countries (Yes/No) 
or an agreement (Yes/Yes or No/No). This scoring technique measures voting coincidence 
between all LAC countries and China by year and was subsequently plotted, allowing us 
 
158 Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey, “United Nations General Assembly Voting 
Data,” ed. Erik Voeten (Harvard Dataverse, 2009), https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ. 
159 United States. Department of State, “Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United 
Nations,” Dept. of State publication, 1985, 4. 
160 Edward T. Rowe, “Changing Patterns in the Voting Success of Member States in the United 
Nations General Assembly: 1945-1966,” International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 231–53. 
161 J.P. Singh and Stuart MacDonald, “Soft  Power Today Measuring the Influences and Effects” 
(Edinburgh, United Kingdom: University of Edinburgh, January 15, 2018). 
162 Flores-Macías and Kreps, “The Foreign Policy Consequences of Trade.” 
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to depict visually how the region aligned with PRC throughout 2000–2017 (see Figure 1). 
Each vote received a 1 if the country aligned with the PRC, 0 if it disagreed, and a value 
of 0.5 if one country voted yes or no, but the other abstained. Next, each country’s “S-
Score” was calculated by summing its vote scores for that year, and dividing by its total 
number of votes that year, in order to determine an annual mean score capturing the degree 
of congruence between a country’s votes and the votes of China. While this method is not 
exact, it has the advantage of providing a reliable measurable representation over time of 
LAC country behavior.  
One potential drawback to this method is that some votes are largely procedural, 
some are more important to the PRC, and some are more important to LAC countries. Since 
this research is attempting to determine when LAC countries were successfully influenced 
by the PRC, it is important only to include votes that matter to China. If every vote were 
to be included, it would be impossible to determine when LAC countries converge with 
the PRC, as votes that have nothing to do with PRCs influence would give a skewed overall 
picture. A method used by Flores-Macis and Kreps to “distinguish directionality of 
convergence” was to only include votes that are important to the PRC.163 Here, only 
resolutions dealing with human rights issues are included in order to accurately predict 
when LAC countries were lining up with PRC interests. Human rights votes are a great 
proxy for PRC influence as the PRC generally always votes and seeks votes in favor of a 
state’s sovereignty and against external intervention. China’s Foreign Ministry stated, “the 
issue of human rights is, in essence, an internal affair of a country.”164 Therefore, 
analyzing only human rights votes, per year, within the UNGA provides a more 
representative look at PRC gaining or losing influence in the region.  
A graph that displays a downward trend in LAC voting coincidence with the PRC 
is displayed in Figure 1. It is important to recognize the differences in voting behavior 
between the two models (see Figures 1 and 2) and to understand how this study could be 
skewed if all votes were taken into account as opposed to human rights votes. Figure 1 
 
163 Flores-Macías and Kreps. 
164 Flores-Macías and Kreps, 361. 
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includes all UNGA votes for each year, while Figure 2 only reflects HR votes. The 
difference demonstrates further the robustness of using only human right resolutions when 
determining PRC influence in LAC.  
UN votes, by their nature, are non-binding and countries are not obligated to 
participate in every action. However, the PRC now participates more in international 
organizations than it has in the past and many believe that the UN is an outlet for the PRC 
to continue to gain influence and spread authoritarian rule as a legitimate form of 
government.165 Additionally, more complicated methods for evaluating states’ influence 
in the UNGA exist using dynamic ordinal spatial models to estimate state ideal points,166 
however, for simplicity of the models, only S-Score is used here.  
165 Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan, “People’s Republic of the United Nations: China’s Emerging 
Revisionism in International Organizations” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security 
(CNAS), April 2019). 
166 Michael A Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, “Estimating Dynamic State Preferences 




Figure 1. All UNGA Votes for LAC Countries from  
2000–2017.167 
  
Figure 2. UN Vote Score (HR Votes Only) for LAC Countries  
from 2000–2017.168 
 
167 Adapted from Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, and Michael Bailey, “United Nations General 
Assembly Voting Data,” August 13, 2019, 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZ. 
168 Adapted from Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey. 
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As we see from Figures 1 and 2, most countries have some degree of positive 
overlap in their voting patterns, however, within these values, there are still substantial 
variations between countries to use for regression analysis. Generally speaking, most 
countries are more likely to vote with China than against them in human rights-related 
votes. Regardless, changes from year to year provide the opportunity to determine if the 
IVs directly affect vote scores.  
It is important to note the generalized voting patterns within LAC countries, 
averaged across all years of the study. Some countries almost always vote with China, and 
thus we do not expect to see major impacts on their scores throughout the years. Likewise, 
some countries have a much lower voting score and thus have differing vote scores 
compared to other nations in the region. Countries with the highest average vote score for 
all years include Cuba (0.98), Venezuela (0.94), St. Lucia, Guyana, and Suriname (all at 
0.91). On the other hand, some countries hold much lower average vote scores, indicating 
a more distant relationship with the PRC. These include Panama (0.72), Peru, Guatemala, 
and Honduras (all at 0.74). It is important to note the influence of the United States in this 
calculation, as generally, these same countries are considered adversarial and friendly, 
respectively, towards the United States. This gives us some confidence that our metric 
successfully captures differing levels of geopolitical influence between these powers. 
C. CONTROL VARIABLES 
Three additional variables are included as controls, given that these IVs are not the 
only potential sources of influence to the LAC region. The models controlled for the level 
of democracy by using the polity score from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict 
Research (INSCR), which measures the level of democracy in each country, ranging from 
-10 (absolute dictatorship) to +10 (consolidated democracy).169 Countries across the polity 
spectrum will likely exhibit different behaviors, including their UN voting. One limitation 
to note with respect to polity is that generally, the INSCR does not provide evaluations of 
 
169 “Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Data Page,” Center for Systemic 
Peace, accessed March 12, 2019, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.  
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polity for many Caribbean nations. Therefore, any model that includes the polity variable 
will not include many of the smaller Caribbean nations.170 
Additionally, two World Development Indicators of country population and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) from the World Bank were used to increase the reliability of the 
results.171 The inclusion of the population size and the size of its respective economy will 
help offset increased PRC activity/investments as a proportion, rather than raw numbers 
taken out of context. Large investments or arms sales can seem considerable but may be 
rendered insignificant by the size of a country’s population and economy.172 
D. HYPOTHESIS  
We hypothesize that the various national levers employed by the PRC will be 
associated with more favorable foreign policies from LAC countries, but not nearly to the 
extent that some believe. While PRC intervention is a cause for concern for United States 
policymakers, we expect that the influence the PRC has been able to gain through 
economic, military, diplomatic and informational campaigns has been only marginally 
successful to date.  
 
170 This study included models with squared versions of polity to account for potential non-linear 
effects, however these variables did not produce statistical significance.  
171 “Population, Total | Data,” The World Bank, accessed May 15, 2019, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2017&start=2000; “GDP (Current US$) | Data,” 
The World Bank, accessed February 26, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
172 All independent variables that showed heavy tailed distribution were logged to adjust for extreme 
values. Full listing of logged and non-logged variables are included in Table 1.  
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V. REGRESSION RESULTS 
The results are presented in Table 1 with a selection of our main regression models 
and the respective variable coefficients with standard errors. IVs with statistical 
significance are marked with asterisks based on the p-value. Additionally, from this table, 
the corresponding relationship between the IVs and UN Human Rights voting can be seen 
as indicated by the positive or negative coefficient. Model 9 was selected as the best overall 
regression model for further discussion and analysis. We developed this model by starting 
with all IVs and control variables in a regression, removing statistically insignificant IVs, 
and exploring interactive variables, aiming to decrease the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) score throughout while maintaining logical controls in the analysis.173 Where no 
results are present, those particular IVs were not included in the respective model due to a 
lack of statistical significance. From this, we see that Model 9 does not include many IVs 








173 The AIC serves as an evaluation metric for the strength of each of the various regression models, 
where the lower score is a more accurate model.  
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Table 1. Regression Results  
  Dependent variable:   
 Human Rights UN Vote Score (Continuous)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Recognize Taiwan -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.020** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.033*** 
(Binary) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
PRC Trade Balance -0.022** -0.022** -0.020** -0.014** -0.013* -0.013* -0.012* -0.013* -0.021*** 
(From PRC to LAC) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
PRC Exports 0.018 0.019* 0.018* -0.011** -0.008** -0.009** -0.008** -0.009** 0.014 
(Logged) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
Military Arms Sales 0.009 0.010* 0.010* 0.006  0.006 0.008* 0.006 0.008* 
(Logged) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total Trade (USD) -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.029***      -0.024*** 
(Logged) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)      (0.009) 
Diplomatic 
Engagements -0.002 
        
(Logged) (0.007)         
Economic Investment 0.002 0.002 0.002       
(Logged) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)       
Aid, Loans, and 
Grants -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
      
(Logged) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)       
PLA Military Events -0.002 -0.003        
(Logged) (0.009) (0.008)        
Confucius Institutes -0.009 -0.008  -0.005      
(Established per year) (0.011) (0.010)  (0.010)      
Confucius Institutes 0.001   0.003      
(Running Total) (0.004)   (0.003)      
Population  -0.012 -0.010 -0.011* -0.019** -0.012** -0.018*** -0.011* -0.018*** -0.016** 
(Logged) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Gross Domestic 
Product 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.015
* 0.009 0.013* 0.007 0.013* 0.014* 
(Logged) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Democracy (Polity) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.033*** -0.004*** -0.033*** -0.025** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) 
Democracy (Polity) -0.0001   -0.0003      
(Squared) (0.0003)   (0.0002)      
Previous Vote Score  0.515*** 0.515*** 0.518*** 0.571*** 0.592*** 0.342*** 0.583*** 0.342*** 0.379*** 
(Human Rights) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.044) (0.043) (0.106) (0.043) (0.106) (0.106) 
Polity & Previous 
Vote Score 
     0.030**  0.030** 0.022* 
(Interaction)      (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant 0.459*** 0.462*** 0.459*** 0.421*** 0.410*** 0.631*** 0.431*** 0.631*** 0.564*** 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.100) (0.100) (0.128) (0.100) (0.128) (0.129)           
Observations 345 345 345 389 389 389 389 389 389 
Log Likelihood 497.398 497.308 496.856 554.271 551.006 555.764 552.615 555.764 559.223 
Akaike Inf. Crit. -960.79 -966.61 -969.71 -1,084.54 -1,086.01 -1,091.52 -1,087.23 -1,091.52 -1,096.44 
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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A comparison of the various selected models’ coefficients is presented in Figure 3, 
with each model displayed as a different color. Where each model contained a specific IV, 
the coefficient is displayed as a point with the rectangle representing standard errors, and 
the lines representing 95% confidence intervals. The main conclusions to be drawn from 
Figure 3 are whether the IVs are positively or negatively associated with changes in the 
voting score. We see from Figure 3 that the model with the lowest AIC score (Model 9, 
displayed in red) shows with high confidence that recognition of Taiwan, PRC trade 
balance, total trade, polity, and population are negatively correlated with LAC UN vote 
scores. In contrast, PRC exports, arms sales, and GDP are considered unreliable because 
the 95% confidence interval crosses the 0 line, indicating uncertainty as to the direction of 
the effect.174 However, the previous year’s vote scores are strongly positively associated 
with the current year’s vote scores.  
 
Figure 3. Regression Coefficients Across Top Four Models based on AIC Score 
 
174 The apparent insignificance of PRC exports in Model 9 may be due to multi-collinearity between 
PRC exports and total trade. In this study, we chose to proceed with the specification in Model 9 because it 
generated the lowest AIC score and maintained logical control variables.  
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After exploring many different regression models, this analysis found that trade 
related IVs, diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and military arms sales to be most 
substantively significant as drivers of change in UN vote score. Diplomatic recognition of 
Taiwan, PRC trade balance, and total trade are negatively associated with UN vote score, 
and military arms sales are positively related. Simply put, as total trade between the PRC 
and LAC countries increases, the vote score decreases. However, as the trade surplus 
increases from LAC countries to the PRC, so does the vote score. As a country recognizes 
Taiwan, their respective vote score decreases. Finally, as arms sales increase, so does the 
LAC country’s vote score.  
Most of the control variables remained statistically significant throughout the 
various models. The results indicate that as polity and population increase, the vote score 
decreases, and as the LAC countries’ GDP increases, so does their vote score. One of the 
most substantively significant variables throughout the study remained the LAC countries’ 
previous year’s vote score. Also, we find variations within this depending on the type of 
government (polity) indicating varying political audience costs for different countries in 
the region. While exports are included in the final model, it is not sufficiently statistically 
significant to draw any useful conclusions. As previously mentioned, many original IVs 
were not found to be statistically significant. This includes diplomatic engagements, 
economic investment, aid, military visits, and Confucius Institutes.  
Table 2 displays a comparative percent change in the dependent variable, when a 
given independent variable is shifted from its minimum to its maximum value. This 
provides context with regard to which IVs are most associated with significant changes in 
the voting score while holding all other IVs at their mean value. For instance, if trade 
balance shifts from -2.38 to 2.37 million USD (logged), we expect to see an 11% drop in 
voting score with China. In contrast, when arms sales move from 0 to 4.57 million USD 
(logged), we see a positive 5% change in voting score. A comparison and assessment of 
minimum to maximum values allow us to create a consistent score to compare the 
effectiveness of each IV across the full range of values seen in the available data.  
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Table 2. Comparative Percent Changes Across Range of Values (2000–2017) 







Taiwan *** 0 1 -0.0326 - 4% 
Trade Balance *** -2.38 2.37 -0.0997 - 11 % 
Exports 1.73 10.48 0.1247 17 % 
Arms Sales * 0 4.57 0.0382 5 % 
Total Trade *** 2.70 11.40 -0.2101 - 23 % 
Population ** 13.55 19.15 -0.0903 - 10 % 
GDP * 20.38 28.59 0.1152 15 % 
Polity ** -7 10 -0.1178 - 13 % 
Previous Voting *** 0.50 1 0.2658 41 % 
Previous Voting (High Polity) *** 0.50 1 0.2983 49 % 
Previous Voting (Mid Polity) *** 0.50 1 0.2057 29 % 
Previous Voting (Low Polity) *** 0.50 1 0.112 13 % 
Statistical Significance: 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05;***p<0.01     
 
Here, we see that among democratic countries, shifting the previous year’s vote 
score generates an expected increase of 49% in the current year’s vote score, indicating the 
strong impact of previous voting behavior, particularly in countries with strong democratic 
constraints. Less impactful, however still significant, are trade balance and total trade. 
Previous voting patterns, trade balance, and total trade will now be discussed in more detail.  
The following three plots display the three most substantively significant IVs and 
their specific predicted values of UN voting score at different levels of the given IV. All 
other variables not displayed were held at their mean for these visualizations. The dark line 
represents the predicted value of the dependent variable, and the shaded bands represent 
the 95% confidence interval. Figure 4 displays the relationship between the current year’s 
vote score and the previous year’s vote score. Here, across all types of government, as 
previous year’s vote score increased, so did the current year’s vote score. However, 
differences are seen between the types of governments both in the slopes and the 
confidence intervals. In more autocratic countries (low polity), we see that the confidence 
interval is quite large below a previous vote score of 0.9. This indicates the high probability 
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of more autocratic governments changing their vote with the PRC from year to year. 
Conversely, in more democratic countries (high polity), the confidence interval is much 
smaller, and the model can predict with higher confidence a democratic country’s projected 
vote, based on previous voting behavior. Put simply, democracies are much more likely to 
vote as they have previously, whereas autocratic countries are more unpredictable in voting 
behavior in line with the PRC. Furthermore, for democratic countries, the change in vote 
score from minimum to maximum values is much higher (49%) compared to autocratic 
countries (13%). This indicates that across democracies, variations, although predictable, 
can vary considerably in range throughout the region. Despite the varying range of 
democratic voting patterns across the range of data, overall, autocratic countries still vote 
more with the PRC than democratic countries.  
 
Figure 4. Current Vote Score by Previous Year’s Vote Score displayed by 
Level of Democracy 
The conclusions to be drawn from Figure 4 are substantial. The main conclusion 
this research suggests is a clear difference in voting behaviors between democracies and 
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autocratic regimes within LAC when dealing with the PRC. This data seems to support 
Fearon’s original conclusions with respect to audience costs where in high-stakes political 
negotiations and deterrence, democracies are more beholden to public opinion compared 
to authoritarian governments.175 While the academic debate continues as to whether this 
theory operates in practice, the main focus of the research on democratic audience costs is 
escalating international crisis and comparative leadership decisions to back down or not.176 
The research presented here seems to augment these arguments by adding another 
perspective when it comes to variations with respect to LAC country voting behavior. 
Granted, in 2017, only Venezuela and Cuba scored a negative polity rating, thus the sample 
size is low. However, there remains a significant difference between authoritarian regimes 
(-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to 5), and democracies (6 to 10). While the variations we see 
here may not actually be due to domestic audience costs, the differences are clear: as polity 
increases, so does the predictability of voting patterns and their expected divergence from 
China’s voting patterns.  
In the next two visualizations, we look at the two most significant non-control 
variables within this study: trade balance and total trade. Figure 5 displays the trade balance 
relationship between the PRC and LAC countries, classified by the LAC countries’ GDP. 
It is important to note here that the trade balance is considered from the PRC perspective, 
not the LAC country perspective. That is, that a positive trade balance is a trade surplus for 
the PRC and a negative trade balance is a trade deficit for the PRC. Across all economy 
sizes within LAC, as the trade balance increases for the PRC, the LAC vote score decreases. 
However, it is important to note that the larger economies (green line) within LAC have a 
higher average vote score than do smaller countries (red line). Here, shifting from 
minimum to maximum amount of trade balance seen in the data, and holding all other 
 
175 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” 
American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92, https://doi.org/10.2307/2944796. 
176 Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental 
Approach,” International Organization 61, no. 4 (2007): 821–40, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070282; Kenneth A Schultz, “Looking for Audience Costs,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 1 (2001): 32–60, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002701045001002; Jessica L. 
Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International Organization 62, 
no. 1 (2008): 35–64, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080028. 
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variables at their mean, there is an 11% drop in average vote score across all years. These 
results show that when LAC countries hold a trade surplus with the PRC, they are more 
likely to vote in line with the PRC’s preferences.  
Shifting slightly, Figure 6  displays total trade between the PRC and LAC countries. 
Here, the same type of relationship is seen, that as total trade increases, the vote score 
decreases. This is consistent across all economy sizes where, generally, larger economies 
(green line) have a higher vote score. With both trade balance and total trade, the highest 
confidence of prediction is in the middle ranges of data. As trade and trade balance move 
to the extremes of the data range, the confidence intervals are larger.  
 
Figure 5. UN Vote Score by Trade Balance displayed by  
GDP of LAC Economies 
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Figure 6. UN Vote Score by Total Trade displayed by  
GDP of LAC Economies  
The results for both the trade balance and total trade are unexpected. The 
consequences of these results are surprising in the fact that generally, emerging nations 
tend to seek out a trade deficit in order to gain foreign investment.177 Here, the indications 
are the opposite; that when LAC countries hold a trade surplus with the PRC, they are more 
likely to vote similarly. These results indicate that despite the considerable documented 
amount of Chinese trade and economic presence,178 the data shows that this trade is not 
gaining influence within UN human rights voting. These results seem to be in line with a 
 
177 Kimberly Amadeo, “The Danger When Imports Exceed Imports,” The Balance, accessed July 14, 
2019, https://www.thebalance.com/balance-of-trade-definition-favorable-vs-unfavorable-3306261. 
178 Jenkins, Peters, and Moreira, “The Impact of China on Latin America and the Caribbean”; 
Margaret Myers and Kevin Gallagher, “Down But Not Out: Chinese Development Finance in LAC, 2017,” 
The Dialogue, no. China-Latin America Report (March 2018); Margaret Myers, Kevin Gallagher, and Fei 
Yuan, “Chinese Finance to LAC in 2015” (Washington: Inter-American Dialogue, February 10, 2016), 
https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/chinese-finance-to-lac-in-2015/; Dollar, “China’s Investment in Latin 
America”; Dollar, “Chinese Investment in Latin America Continues to Expand.” 
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different camp of scholars that believe the increased PRC economic presence is not gaining 
strategic concessions.179 
The results of trade and trade balance are also counter to the only other quantitative 
study comparing trade to UN voting. The 2013 Flores-Macias study “China’s Commercial 
Relations with Africa and Latin America” found high levels of trade and trade dependence 
produce foreign policy convergence in UN human rights voting.180 One explanation is that 
the 2013 study also included African counties whereas this research is solely based on the 
LAC region. Secondly, this research includes many other variables across the DIME 
spectrum that were not included in the Flores study. Lastly, the date in the Flores study 
range from 1996–2006 and data for this research covers 2000–2017.  
Arms sales are also worth mentioning as one of the PRC activities positively 
associated with favorable voting patterns. While not as statistically significant as the 
previous variables, shifting from the minimum to maximum observed values of military 
arms sales, the model predicts an increase of 5% in voting score. While these arms sales 
may not have specific political or diplomatic intentions, they are apparently influencing 
voting behavior. This finding seems to support previous studies by Ellis and Gurrola.181 
While the results reported above provide important insights into the PRC’s 
influence in LAC, it is important to recognize the limitations of the methods used to analyze 
the data available. First, our models are based on a small number of observations. This 
limited amount of data observations stems from the data sources available. For example, 
many Caribbean nations do not receive a polity score. Future research efforts would benefit 
from more in-depth data sources and/or creative ways to supplement missing data. 
Additionally, the 5% level to assess statistical significance represents an arbitrary threshold 
 
179 Néstor Castañeda, “New Dependency?: Economic Links between China and Latin America,” 
Issues and Studies 53, no. 1 (2017): 1–33, https://doi.org/10.1142/S101325111740001X. 
180 Gustavo A. Flores-Macías and Sarah E. Kreps, “The Foreign Policy Consequences of Trade: 
China’s Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992–2006,” The Journal of Politics 75, no. 
2 (2013): 357–71, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000066. 
181 R. Evan Ellis, “Should the United States Be Worried about Chinese Arms Sales in the Region?,” 
Global Americans, May 11, 2015, https://theglobalamericans.org/2015/05/should-u-s-be-worried-about-
chinese-arms-sales-in-the-region/; George Gurrola, “China-Latin America Arms Sales: Antagonizing the 
United States in the Western Hemisphere?,” Military Review 98, no. 4 (2018): 123. 
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based on normal statistical analysis. This implies that one cannot be fully certain of the 
magnitude of the effects reported above based on the data available and the large number 
of covariates. 
The use of lagged IVs and DVs allows us to partially address the potential for 
endogenous and spurious associations, however, it remains possible that additional factors 
that can influence UN voting were omitted from the final model. Such examples include 
the long-term effects of United States foreign policy in the region, domestic ideology, or 
third-party trade with countries external to the region. Here, only PRC activities are 
considered to isolate the potential effects and ramifications considering the claims of a 
growing threat to national security. Future research could expand on these with additional 
control variables and longer lag periods.  
A. IMPLICATIONS 
While there are bound to be exceptions, the findings indicate that the PRC is not 
gaining considerable concessions when it comes to the voting tendencies of LAC countries. 
Within the data presented, above all else, the best indicator for future voting is previous 
voting behavior for all types of governments. This pattern should be reassuring for policy-
makers as previous vote score is a very measurable and observable act by both LAC 
countries and the PRC within the UNGA. Slight changes in voting behavior over time can 
be measured and with a high degree of confidence (combined with other inputs into the 
model), and anticipated future voting scores can thereby be predicted. Here it is important 
to consider that democracies are more likely to vote in line with previous behavior than 
more authoritarian governments, especially at the lower ranges of voting scores.  
One of the most surprising implications of this study was how many IVs were not 
found to be statistically significant. The IVs not found to have statistical significance were 
diplomatic visits, aid, economic investment, PLA military events, and Confucius Institutes. 
This is not to say that these actions by the PRC do not gain leverage in other aspects of its 
relationship with LAC countries; however, when considering UN human rights voting, the 
evidence does not support the hypothesized effects for these factors. Until more 
comprehensive data sources are included in the study, no definitive answer can be drawn 
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on the effects, or lack thereof, for the statically insignificant variables. In this case, the 
absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence. 
This conclusion seems to be in line with Evan Ellis’s assessment of PLA military 
activity in LAC that the PRC “does not seek to achieve formal alliances or permanent 
military presence in the region but rather to advance commercial and political 
objectives.”182 If this remains true, the referenced commercial and political objectives are 
likely outside the purview of gaining influence within the UN. Additionally, despite the 
PRC’s $90 billion in investment between 2005 and 2016 to LAC,183 there does not appear 
to be much observable return on investment in terms of gaining geopolitical influence. This 
conclusion seems to be contrary to many experts’ opinions on PRC investment and aid 
practices in the region184 and more in line with Harold Trinkunas’ argument that “China’s 
trade, investment, and loans are not large enough to enable Chinese authorities to directly 
pressure Latin American counterparts into changing domestic policy.”185 In the end, these 
results present opportunities for extremely interesting conclusions in the on-going great 
power competition space. The broader implications of the results, limitations of this study, 
and the need for further research are addressed in the following chapter.  
 
182 Ellis, China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic 
Position. 
183 Gonzalez, “Latin America – China Trade and Investment Amid Global Tensions: A Need to 
Upgrade and Diversify,” 5. 
184 Myers and Gallagher, “Down But Not Out: Chinese Development Finance in LAC, 2017,” 5; 
Vadell, “China in Latin America: South-South Cooperation with Chinese Characteristics.” 




A. NO SIMPLE ANSWERS  
Throughout this research, the answer to whether or not PRC’s undertakings are 
gaining it leverage in LAC revealed itself to be extremely nuanced and not as straight 
forward as originally hoped. Various levers have different effects on different countries, so 
applying a regional answer to individual countries can be misleading and often incorrect. 
It is possible to give a broad answer across the region, but it is important to note that while 
the LAC region is homogenous in many aspects, individual countries are fiercely 
independent and respond to PRC activities in different ways, just as American influence is 
accepted or rejected across the region. A given variable may be extremely effective in 
influencing one country’s UN voting in favor of the PRC, but might have the opposite 
effect on a country that it borders. Accepting the complexity of the question is key when 
conceptualizing the final results of the study. Regardless, policy-makers and planners can 
use this initial research to tailor current United States positions in the region and to more 
closely monitor certain PRC activities as a strong indicator of shifting voting patterns. At 
the same time, it may be important to accept that other variables, previously thought to be 
extremely influential, are not as impactful as once thought.  
B. PROBLEM IS BIGGER THAN SOF  
Admiral Tidd understood clearly the gravity of the problem and the importance of 
understanding PRC activity through more than just a military lens.186 SOF play a major 
role in complementing regional partnerships, supporting country team efforts in various 
countries, and maintaining key partnerships at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 
While understanding SOF capabilities is important, it is also vital to understand what the 
limitations and areas that SOF are unable to affect. This analysis examined several  
 
 
186 Tidd, “Posture Statement of United States Southern Command before the 115th Congress SASC.” 
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independent variables with an intent to understand where the PRC is prioritizing its 
energy in LAC as well as which initiatives are gaining influence within the region. China’s 
objectives in the region are likely economic in nature, as military arms sales, port visits, 
and exercises make up a tiny fraction of the overall expenditures compared to economic 
investment, aid, and total bi-lateral trade.  
Some PRC projects could be leveraged in the future (ports, airports, railways) for 
military operations and various telecommunications industries for intelligence support. 
However, this argument could be made for any county’s efforts abroad, and the United 
States should be careful not to exaggerate the intent of PRC projects beyond their stated 
purpose. China’s pursuit in LAC provides a challenge to the influence of the United States 
in the region, but viewing every PRC project through a lens of hostile intent and as 
precursors to military action is shortsighted and counterproductive. Evan Ellis explains that 
“[It] is important to emphasize that none (of the PRC objectives) implies the inherent 
rejection by the PRC of coexistence with the United States, nor a disposition to act against 
it…” 187 Even though growing PRC activity is mostly economic in nature, SOF still has a 
vital role to play in the region.  
There is no question that the PLA expanded its military activity in LAC, with an 
intent to gain influence with partner nations and undermine hard-earned United States 
partnerships. However, it is important to continue spending energy on maintaining our 
status as the “partner of choice” as opposed to blocking PRC military activity and 
potentially be seen as inhibiting the freedom of choice for LAC countries. Many of the 
PRC activities that United States forces could effectively monitor and report on were found 
to be statistically insignificant as drivers of growing PRC influence. This is not to say that 
activities such as port visits, military exchanges, aid projects, and economic investment 
should not be monitored, nor that those activities are not gaining concessions for the PRC.  
 
 
187 David Denoon, ed., China, the United States, and the Future of Latin America, U.S.-China 
Relations, volume III (New York: New York University Press, 2017). 
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However, from the perspective of evidence presented here, it would be a wasted 
effort to re-mission SOF to specifically monitor and assess PRC activities. While it makes 
sense for SOF to monitor PRC military activity passively, this should not come at the 
expense of maintaining invaluable partnerships and access and placement for SOF sensors 
throughout the region. SOF manpower is best still utilized in other efforts in the region, 
such as counter-narco terrorism and Foreign Internal Defense. Put simply, our evidence 
indicates that the best thing SOUTHCOM can do in the region is maintain, and if possible, 
expand security cooperation with various forces and not be seen as aggressively 
intervening into PRC activity. If LAC countries are allowed to decide on their own, the 
partner of choice for most will continue to be the United States.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH  
While the goal here was to determine whether the PRC is gaining leverage in the 
SOUTHCOM region, it is important to note that these findings are limited to UN voting 
patterns. The PRC’s intentions within the region are likely not limited to gaining 
concessions and a friendlier voting atmosphere within the UN. While this study takes an 
important step in attempting to quantify aspects of the problem, future research would 
benefit from the construction of broader measures of the causes and consequences foreign 
influence. A comparative study examining efforts by both the United States and PRC could 
also prove very telling and assist in producing a more robust influence model.  
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Only displayed countries with 2017 voted in the UN HR votes.  
Figure 7. 2017 LAC Voting Coincidence with the PRC  
Furthermore, qualitative studies that focus on single countries or regions within 
LAC to complement the quantitative analysis would provide a more holistic picture of both 
the PRC activity within the area and various reactions to it. Figure 7 is a visualization and 
ranking of LAC countries’ human rights voting coincidence with the PRC in 2017. 
Graphics like this can assist planners with prioritization efforts and country metrics. 
Tracking this year to year is a technique to monitor specific countries’ aversion or 
inclination to vote in line with the PRC. This bar graph also illuminates potential qualitative 
studies as some nations listed towards the top of the chart are considered friendly nations 




At present, it is extremely difficult to measure PRC and United States influence in 
the region. Policymakers and planners do not have a complete “matrix” to monitor PRC 
activity and the LAC reactions associated with growing external influences. The model 
presented here provides an example of how to quantitatively compare the two, but an 
expansion of this research with additional dependent variables to measure LAC responses 
would also have the potential to assist in developing a more complete scoring system. 
Developing a system to score the population’s response on various social media platforms, 
various media coverage, backlash (or praise) to PRC projects, and influential personalities 
opinions would provide a more holistic answer to whether or not PRC initiatives are 
gaining traction or falling on deaf ears. 
D. STOP THE EXAGGERATION 
These initial results are surprising given the alarming literature thus far regarding 
PRC and LAC. The overwhelming majority of academic research to date cites growing 
PRC activity and investment in LAC as leading to inevitable influence. The initial 
conclusion of this thesis is contrary to these findings and concludes that the factors 
underlying the PRC’s growing influence in the UN are limited to PRC trade balance, total 
trade, and to a lesser extent, military arms sales.  
Another key factor that supports the above findings is the uniqueness of the 
relationship between the United States and LAC. Unlike most regions of the world, the 
United States has long been the sole hegemon in the region, and it will be much harder for 
an outside power to supersede that relationship. David Denoon explains that “China has 
made major commitments of trade, aid, and direct investments, but these initiatives have 
produced limited results.”188 Furthermore, given the political changes and economic 
hardships in countries such as Venezuela, Brazil, and Bolivia, “Chinese investment may 
be seen as a disappointment.”189 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi address the danger of 





concern in US-China relations.”190 Caution should be heeded as the more extreme views 
of nefarious Chinese global activities do not seem to have manifested themselves within 
Latin America and the Caribbean. This research suggests that “eroding the bases for deep 
distrust over long-term intentions and facilitating greater mutual understanding and 
cooperation” is a more pragmatic approach than one of hostility and fear.191 In the end, 
the best possible course of action for American policy-makers with respect to the PRC in 
LAC is to maintain and expand current relationships to continue to protect the homeland 
from localized and third-party threats. It would be a failure of effective decision making 
and thoughtful foreign policy to assess the PRC as the gravest threat to United States 
security and stability in the Western Hemisphere without considering the quantitative 




190 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” n.d., 65. 
191 Lieberthal and Jisi. 
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APPENDIX A.  COUNTRY LIST OF LAC COUNTRIES 










11. Saint Kitts and Nevis 
12. Saint Lucia 
13. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
14. Trinidad and Tobago 
15. Belize 
16. Costa Rica 
















33. Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic 
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192 Countries without a blue line do not have a polity score, thus are not included in the final model. 
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